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In 1984, Craig Heron published the seminal “Labourism and the Canadian Working
Class.”1 My contribution to this festschrift in his honour may be considered an ex-
tended meditation upon—and applied empirical application of—some of  the im-
portant ideas in this important article. In it, Heron undertakes to explain “how,
where, and when labourism strode onto the political stage, and to scrutinize its ide-
ological complexion more carefully.” Labourism, he argues,
was a distinct ideological form in Canadian politics, resembling
but differing from agrarian populism, contemporary liberalism,
and socialism, and the brand of  social democracy which emerged
after 1930. It was, moreover, the main ideological current in in-
dependent working-class politics east of  the Rockies before 1920.2
Labourism was the “political expression of  a distinct layer of  the working class”—
i.e., skilled workers in manufacturing, construction and mining—and its ideological
hues reflected “the worldview of  the skilled worker.”3 A “growing disillusionment
and cynicism with electoral politics” made it possible for this ideology to flourish,
and it often came to prominence at times of  acute industrial conflict, as skilled
workers carried their workplace organizing traditions “outward to social and political
relationships in the wider community.”4
Labourism was, to a significant degree, liberalism—albeit a liberalism taken
into, and modified by, a milieu of  skilled workers. In Britain, one might trace its an-
cestry to Tom Paine, the English Jacobins, the Chartists, and “by the 1860s, into
the Radical wing of  that dynamic Victorian reform coalition, the Gladstonian Lib-
eral Party.”5 In Canada, it could be traced to kindred movements and, after the
1890s, to the Liberal Party, which made “a recognized place for organized workers
alongside the francophones, farmers, Catholics, and corporate capitalists in the Lib-
eral alliance.”6 This Liberal coalition held together through much of  the period from
the 1880s to the 1920s, displacing an older paternalism predicated on the “produc-
ers’ alliance.” 
The liberal regimes that exercised hegemony in Canada—some called
“Liberal Conservative,” others “Reform,” and others just “Liberal”—often made
friendly gestures towards a working-class constituency, “most assiduously in the
Maritimes and Quebec, and on the Prairies.” Yet at regular intervals these regimes
had to absorb the “seismic shock waves of  industrial conflict.” And, largely thanks
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to such shocks, the “first quasi-independent organizing on the edge of  official Lib-
eralism, a phenomenon known as Liberal-Labourism,” morphed into Labourism,
as Radicalism moved “outside the Liberal Party to become labourism.”7 Yet
Labourists “seldom strayed far from their Radical roots”—i.e., their roots in such
liberal ideals as the “brotherhood of  man” and “community of  interest among cit-
izens,” which, they typically suggested, meant “that all citizens should have full ac-
cess to a neutral apparatus which could serve an undefined common good. Here
was the purest legacy of  Jacobin democracy.”8 Such working-class liberals—or
labourists—argued for “equal rights for individuals,” which would assure “equal
rights for classes.”9 They targeted “the monopolists and the middlemen—the evil
forces of  economic ‘privilege’”—who “interfered with the productive life of  the
country and threatened working-class living standards.”10
Although in agreement on many issues, labourists could be distinguished
from liberals. Specifically, labourists distrusted mainstream liberals’ worship of  pro-
fessional expertise and resented middle-class enthusiasm for meddling with the
“child-rearing practices or leisure pursuits of  the working class.”11 Nor, in fact, did
they share the middle-class liberals’ full-throated individualism: “Despite the indi-
vidualistic thrust of  the liberal heritage, they wanted to raise the whole working
class to full equality.”12 Here was a movement that “reasserted a faith in radical
democracy in the face of  political corruption and manipulation and, perhaps more
importantly, in the face of  new elitist theories of  the state which were modelled on
the private corporation.”13
It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of  Heron’s article,
which has held up well after more than three decades. It certainly fits much of  the
electoral experience of  the coal miners of  Nova Scotia’s mainland Cumberland
County from the 1880s to the 1930s. Turning against the Conservative Party of  na-
tive son and National Policy booster Charles Tupper, voters elected Hance Logan
as their Member of  Parliament (MP) in 1896—in large measure because Logan had
defended Joggins coal miners who had taken up arms against their employer.  In
the 1920s and 1930s, Springhill miners elected fellow miner Archie Terris as their
provincial Member of  Legislative Assembly (MLA)—first as a Labour and then as
a “Conservative-Labour” member. While electoral politics demonstrates the
strengths of  Heron’s thesis and a gradual transition from Liberal Conservatism in
the 1870s to labour-oriented Liberalism in the 1890s, and then to Labourism in the
1910s and 1920s, this paper traces working-class liberalism at another, more “mol-
ecular” level: in the coal mines of  Springhill from 1879 to 1890, when the miners
nourished Pioneer Lodge of  the Provincial Workmen’s Association (PWA). This
lodge was the PWA’s first major local and initially the home—and long the sup-
porter—of  its intrepid organic intellectual, Robert Drummond. Drummond went
from being an underground boss to a newspaper editor, and thence to the Legisla-
tive Council—one of  the first labour men to attain such prominent public office in
Canada. 
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Springhill, located near the western boundary of  mainland Nova Scotia,
is now remembered for the terrible mine disasters of  1956 and 1958, and as the
hometown of  singer Anne Murray. It was a nineteenth-century boomtown that
grew from a tiny hamlet in the 1870s to a bustling community of  more than 5,000
in the early twentieth century. Nova Scotia’s first stable and significant coal miners’
union, the Provincial Miners’ Association—shortly renamed the Provincial Work-
men’s Association—was born there in 1879. From 1879 to 1890, the miners existed
within, and were strongly influenced by, a workplace structured according to the
competitive dictates of  classical property-oriented liberalism. These coal miners ad-
mirably filled Heron’s model of  liberal labourites—Lib-Labs—and because of  their
particular stances with respect to property, equality, and freedom, also offered fas-
cinating local divergences from it. To put that in grander terms, I would add to
Heron’s pantheon of  significant figures such as Tom Paine and William Gladstone
the names of  John Locke and Jeremy Bentham.
Coal miners responded to and, to a point, absorbed the logic of  possessive
individualism, which made self-ownership and command of  property a core crite-
rion of  full membership in a liberal order. In their case, the possessive individualist
ethos was sometimes resisted and sometimes internalized, and it played a key role
in the rise and subsequent crisis of  this form of  classical liberal trade unionism in
the 1890s. The radical democracy to which Craig so invaluably called our attention,
and which is found like a bright red thread through the history of  Pioneer Lodge,
was always tempered by a Lockean preoccupation with property and a Benthamite
enthusiasm for the mine as a well-governed, scientific, and orderly machine. Miners
were embedded within a complex order of  property that only slowly and partially
succumbed to a rival logic of  collective working-class solidarity. 
Property is always political and always a nexus of  complicated relation-
ships. The coalfield bears out this maxim in spades. Just to ask, “who owned the
coal?” suggests some of  these political complexities. Thanks to the British
monarch’s unusual exercise of  the royal prerogative in the eighteenth century, coal
in the ground, along with other specified treasures, was the property of  the provin-
cial state, which grew increasingly dependent upon the royalties it generated
throughout the nineteenth century. Yet once the coal was secured by a coal com-
pany—of  which there were dozens from the 1860s to the 1880s—it became prop-
erty of  that company, on the condition that the government receive requisite
royalties. In the Springhill case, the mine grew increasingly dependent upon the se-
cure and profitable market afforded by the state-owned Intercolonial Railway (ICR),
which also “owned” the coal once it bought it. However, from the coal miner’s
point of  view, he also owned the coal he dug and placed within a coal car, to which
he affixed his own tag—he certainly cried blue murder when it seemed the company
or fellow workers had improperly appropriated it. 
Springhill’s mines almost invariably worked on the bord-and-pillar system,
which entailed miners working, with a partner and often a loader, in their own
66 McKay
“places.” They managed the day-to-day running of  such places—maintaining tim-
bering to support the roof, laying rails to facilitate moving the coal, and in the 1880s
and 1890s, superintending the work of  loaders. Miners often named particular places
after the men who worked in them, and such “proprietors” often expected to be
able to return to their places after recovering from an accident or illness. A good
many coal miners had recently been farmers, accustomed to freehold tenure. From
their perspective, one way of  thinking about the coal mine was as a large set of  rel-
atively independent workplaces, each producing a similar product, but in some cases
charging dissimilar prices. These “archetypal proletarians” were also, in their own
minds, property-holders in the mine, as per political theorist C.B. Macpherson’s def-
inition of  property as “an enforceable claim to some use or benefit of  something,”
rather than an “exclusive, alienable, ‘absolute’ individual or corporate right in
things”—an absolutism that could never work, or at least never work smoothly, in
this complicated context.14 Unless a manager were willing to respect the coal miners’
judgment and rule through indirect suggestion, he stood to lose a great deal of  time
and energy in quarrels with them.
Thus, three parties enjoyed property rights over the coal—albeit rights
very different in character and exercised with varying degrees of  effectiveness. As
Marx and Engels urged in 1848, and many times afterwards, proletarians are such
because they are propertyless—generating surplus value for capitalists who own the
means of  production. Yet, were the miners, strictly speaking, propertyless with re-
spect to the mine? Yes, but only to a point. They directly owned very significant
“forces of  production,” i.e., the gunpowder that played an indispensable role in
mining until 1891, and the picks with which the coal was extracted. They also em-
ployed other workers: in the nineteenth century, loaders were employed by the coal
cutters, who could get in serious trouble if  they enticed an excellent loader to work
by paying him beyond the rate agreed upon by the union. And indirectly, in their
own minds at least, they “owned” the coal they produced.
If  we may take it for granted that no coal miner would have prevailed in
court, had he insisted upon his “enforceable claim” to the coal mine as a means of
production and to his “own” coal, we should also remind ourselves of  the abundant
evidence that coal miners asserted, with some success, their own “enforceable
claims” to property—i.e., their rights to a particular place, to their own picks, and
to the proceeds from their coal. In particular, coal miners exerted themselves not to
be excluded from such property rights; that is, not to be given inferior places in the
mine, to be undersold by unscrupulously recruited new employees, or to have
“their” coal stolen from them at the bank-head through dishonest weighing proce-
dures.They often defended themselves with the impeccably Lockean argument that,
having mixed their labour with the coal, it—along with the place in the mine from
whence it came—rightfully belonged more to them than to the company or to the
state. 
Of  course, the company enjoyed vast privileges as the monopolistic buyer
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of  the miners’ coal, and its managers exercised the legal right to govern this realm—
for instance, to decide which miners worked in which places. However, from the
miners’ perspective, the top brass had to play within the rules. By and large, the
men themselves had the right to select the partners with whom they worked. More-
over, places could not be allocated inequitably. Indeed, the miners themselves exer-
cised the property right to close a “place” that was unrewarding, or to charge extra
for working under conditions that diminished their capacity to make a fair return
or generate a decent living. Deficient places, particularly those that were wet or
“stony”—i.e., with lots of  stone that was not coal—were contested fiercely by the
union and denounced passionately in the workers’ press. The union fought often
and hard on such questions, and enjoyed a good measure of  success.
Pioneer Lodge fought 72 cases with the company from 1882 to 1886, and
of  these, just under a third (32 per cent) involved a charge that a place was deficient
and the miners were not able to “make a wage.” Some of  the places in Springhill
were so wet, wrote a correspondent with pardonable exaggeration, that miners
would be well-advised to bring their “diving suits.”15 The physical conditions of  the
mine tended to discourage common standards. A delegate to the Grand Council
of  the PWA described the highly individualistic state of  bargaining in the mine in
1889:
Bro. P. McKay was puzzled as to what opinion to express in ref-
erence to Spring Hill. He had worked in many coal mines but a
stranger place than Spring Hill to work in he had never entered.
It would be a difficult matter to get all the men in Spring Hill on
an equal footing. There were too many subdivisions both as to
rates and to places. No two pair of  men were on the same footing
as two other pairs. 16
There was no overall framework governing the remuneration of  contract labour in
the mine, although some underground maintenance workers and surface workers
seemingly did work according to an explicit and standard rate of  wages. But not
the miners—i.e., the men who actually dug the coal. In the classical liberal mine of
the 1880s, there was no collective agreement by which miners regulated the price
of  their labour, nor even a list of  prices for certain tasks. Even the concept of  pay-
ing all workers on the same basis could be questioned in this setting.17 In 1888, some
miners, apparently eager to get work in an overcrowded mine, agreed to work a bal-
ance at a lower rate than in the adjoining balance.18 In other words, different wage
scales, for the same work, could be found in the same section of  the same mine. 
Even an ostensible victory—such as an 1888 promise by management to
increase wages by five per cent—could be a defeat in disguise, since it was not ap-
plied to other jobs (such as timbering) the miners had to undertake. In the hetero-
geneous conditions of  the mine, an apparent wage increase could actually entail a
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wage reduction. The miners persistently complained that the pit was “overcrowded,”
with too many miners overwhelming the haulage system and forcing some of  them
to double up in places. The overall workforce increased more than two-fold in the
late 1880s. Some interpreted the policy of  overcrowding as a Machiavellian strategy
to dilute the workers’ power. The very term “overcrowding” suggested a widely-
shared consensus that made it possible to distinguish a mine with a proper hiring
policy from one that was infringing an unwritten rule. As one miner complained,
If  a manager induces another to go into a business which will not
give him sufficient to maintain his family, and when his going into
that business impoverishes others, I think he has committed a
heinous crime, especially when his only object is to keep his other
employees so poor that they cannot be else than slaves.19
Note that in this miner’s mind, individuals entering the mine were analogous to in-
dividuals engaging in a business. 
Considering their inability to safeguard their property rights by limiting
access to employment, these miners were not in the same position as urban craft
workers, who, in many cases, could restrict entry to their trades through customary
hiring practices, i.e., closed shops and apprenticeship regulations. Yet, like such craft
workers, miners believed strongly that they were practitioners of  very valuable skill-
sets. If  each of  these skills was in a sense easily acquired, the overall knack of  min-
ing, upon which one’s very life might depend, was not. “Some people think that a
miner just goes down there and works away,” one Springhill miner told me indig-
nantly in 1978: 
But mining is a profession—or some word to that effect. Mining
is like anything else—it’s like carpentry work. You’ve got to know
what to do, you’ve got to know how to do it … There is a skill in
it. A lot of  people think, ‘A dirty old miner, a dirty old miner,’ you
see? But it’s a skillful job.20
A profession, a trade, or a craft? Whatever it was, the knack of  coal mining was not
easily fit into a rigid model of  the “skilled” or the “unskilled.” 
While coal miners faced real limitations to their capacity to act as prop-
erty-holders in the mine in the 1880s, their skill sets nonetheless also gave them a
considerable degree of  prestige and power.  Largely because of  their privileged ac-
cess and control over property—i.e., their places with their revenues—coal miners
were an elite group within a variegated workforce. They made about 80 percent
more in wages than ordinary labourers. Although the activists of  the PWA did make
a feeble effort to sign up everybody in the mine, they soon gave up. There were
some angry moments in the Lodge when miners, loading their own coal, were con-
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demned for stealing the loaders’ work. Pioneer Lodge ruled on such cases as a work-
ing-class court of  law. Members were “tried” for their failure to maintain certain
standards, particularly those relating to the price of  coal. It handled 137 cases from
1882–86: about 36 cases a year.21 A total of  92.9 per cent of  the cases concerned
the mining and loading of  coal; the only other categories of  work worth mentioning
were those of  timbering and tracklaying (1.8 per cent), and shift work (1.8 per cent).
The miner’s domination of  this union was far out of  proportion to his presence in
the workforce. By far most cases (68.6 per cent) were settled within seven days. 
The mining environment multiplied the grievances of  the workers, and
gave these grievances a peculiarly intractable character. At the same time, it created
a proletarian public sphere, one in which these grievances could be systematically
and stubbornly addressed. In the absence of  a far-ranging technological revolution
in mining, the miners knew as much about their workplaces as their bosses. The
coal miners became renowned for their insistence upon their own knowledge and
their “capacity to judge” conditions of  the mine: they constituted a forum in which
almost every aspect of  the mine could come up for debate. They implicitly broke
with orthodox liberalism, by asserting a working-class “capacity to judge” a question
that most nineteenth-century liberals would have consigned to the private concerns
of  a particular enterprise.22 They demanded, in essence, a form of  responsible gov-
ernment in the pit. 
If  this is enough to make Marxists wring their hands, we Marxists nonethe-
less can take solace in the insight that these hardened individualists functioned as
human parts of  a vast machine. Their individualism was founded upon a functional
egalitarianism. Every moving part of  this giant coal-producing machine, both
human and non-human, had to be harmonized for the thing to work at all. With-
draw the men who kept the fans working, or the trapper boys who manned the
doors—some of  them as young as nine years old—and the mine perforce shut
down. The imperatives of  functional integration worked against the formation of
any cohesive, exclusive body of  self-interested individualists, no matter how mate-
rially privileged they were. Coal miners who were unpleasant to drivers might find
themselves without their fair share of  coal cars. And because many mining families
had members employed at various jobs in the pit, the economic interest of  the coal
miner was often identical with those of  his elder son, the cage-runner: all con-
tributed to the family income. A collier might have been tempted to look down his
nose at a mere trapper boy responsible for “trapping door” and keeping the air cur-
rents in order—the very acme of  the tedious menial job—but that trapper boy
might well be his twelve-year-old offspring.
Perhaps the most vivid examples of  the miners placing solidarity ahead
of  their own interests crop up in the various boys’ strikes. Management delighted
in throwing these strikes in the miners’ faces as a sign of  their indiscipline and de-
fective parenthood. In many other Canadian contexts, strikes by such juvenile work-
ers were usually broken without much ado. In this one, the boys could shut down
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a large workplace of  over 1,000 workers because they wanted a day off  to go to the
circus or a baseball game, and in one case because a boy had allegedly been caught
in a sexual situation with a pit pony.23 Yet even in such cases, the miners rarely suc-
cumbed to the temptation to leave the pit boys high and dry—partly because the
boys were kin, and partly because the miners depended on them to operate the
mine upon which they all depended. They were, in that sense, apostles of  the doc-
trine of  practical utilitarianism: of  Jeremy Bentham as well as John Locke. In con-
tradistinction to the argument that labourism was somewhat allergic to progressive
reform, many articulate coal miners were avid proponents of  modernizing the mine.
If  by scientific management we mean the attempt to heighten productivity by more
precisely measuring and integrating diverse tasks, many coal miners sincerely pro-
claimed their passion for the cause. 
Over and above this imperfectly integrated structure was the management.
In law, the general manager of  the mine was responsible for his employees and his
mines, and all the day-to-day decisions fell upon his shoulders. Legally, there was
no equality here. The manager stood in the same relation to the mine as did the
captain to his ship, with his various subalterns as second mates. He was responsible
for the integration of  the various systems making up the mine, and it was a heavy
responsibility.
Despite some alluring but deceptive instances of  managerial paternalism,
the coal miners actually adhered more closely to Heron’s Jacobin script. For example,
they even gave their underground manager a loving cup at one point—purportedly
a symbol of  their high esteem for him—and recorded in their own minute book
that the general manager was “a true gentleman,” because he wanted to set up a
reading room for his workers.24 Yet, the miners’ radical tone was nowhere more in
evidence than in their egalitarian commentaries on these very same managers, whom
they sometimes described as little more than unnecessary middlemen. Even the
“true gentleman” manager—who was simultaneously ridiculed in the workers’ press
as “too sweet to be wholesome”—was placed under enormous pressure by the coal
miners.25 He responded angrily to the almost intolerable pressure exerted by the
lodge in the short strike waged in 1885, by throwing a union committee out of  his
office. He later apologized, explaining that “he would lit [let] this pass as he was
cross and tired last night.”26 One is interested both in the evidence of  conflict and
the language in which the manager’s apology was expressed—suggesting a percep-
tion that his relations with his men could not profitably be allowed to worsen be-
yond recall.
Subaltern officials in the mine—many of  them drawn from the miners’
ranks—occupied a highly ambiguous position. They were answerable to the mine
manager and superintendent; to the state (which might investigate any violations
against the Coal Mines Regulation Act); to the miners with whom they came into
day-to-day contact; and to the implacably harsh demands of  nature itself, which
constantly challenged them with floods, fires, and roof  collapses.27 Responsible to
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both the company and the state, the subaltern officials’ position was further com-
plicated by the near impossibility of  controlling the geographical space of  the
mine.28 On one side of  the “frontier of  control,” encompassing the bank-head, of-
fice, shops, and the main slope, the management faced oversight problems little
more severe than those faced in industrial establishments generally. But on the other
side, the management faced truly intractable difficulties in enforcing its will, and it
was on this side—where the balance of  control was most sharply contested—that
its most crucial struggles for productivity and efficiency had to be won. It was a
measure of  the management’s desperation, if  also of  the deteriorating relationship
between employer and employee, that it started systematically spying on its most
vocal workers in 1888.
When R.G. Leckie, the “gentleman” manager praised a few years earlier,
fell from power in 1888, his role as leader of  the mine was taken up by Henry Swift.
Swift’s letters reveal a whole-hearted attempt to bring the Springhill mines under
disciplined and unified control. They are also a constant record of  disappointed
hopes and acute anxiety, as he was facing a near-impossible task. In one of
Springhill’s most significant slopes in 1891, there were only three officials, overseeing
the work of  155 contract miners, spread out over a great distance. Swift’s mine was
in a perpetual state of  emergency.29
Since we have already dealt with property and equality, we should also
spend at least some time on the ideal that gives liberalism its name: liberty. The
most obvious indication of  liberalism in the coal mines was the defence of  freedom
of  speech, typified by the union organ, the Trades Journal, which was an unprece-
dented and consistent source of  critical commentary. Yet such free commentary
was hardly restricted to the newspaper. The meetings of  Pioneer Lodge were char-
acterized by intense debates—what its long-suffering secretary once called “the
usual long discussion.”30 Henry Swift lamented that the mine echoed with ill-
recorded and self-serving commentaries: “This I told you and you told me and I
told somebody else,” he wrote sarcastically, “and when anything happens everyone
is looking around for a loop hole to Crawl in…”31 In one pungent testimonial to
the miners’ all-too-free speech, Swift discussed their response to a new-style coal
car: 
The box reffered [referred] to had what they call patent Wheels in
but loose in the axle [.] [E]very one seems loud in denouncing the
Wheels [.] … [O]ne says he wished they were all in Siberia another
says he wished they were all in Purgatory. [F]or my part I think
them first rate … [A]nything new always meets with a certain
amount of  prejudice when first introduced. 32
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From the miners’ perspective, innovations in the mine were often intro-
duced without taking workers’ interests into account. Patently unscientific systems
of  ventilation were critiqued in unforgiving detail:
An attempt some time since, was made to make of  this ‘slope’ a
model mine, laid out in the latest, most improved, scientific meth-
ods. The conception was grand, but the result was disappointing.
The planners had it in their head to do a much more impracticable
thing than making water run up hill. They tried to induce two op-
posing currents of  air to meet, say good day to each other, and
then pass on their respected missions. But they wouldn’t. There
was not a particle of  harmony between them. As surely as they
met so surely did they chaff, and wrestle and baffle one another.
In the battle for supremacy all consideration for the workmen was
cast aside.33
When one manager appeared before the Labour Commission in 1888, he was asked
how he went about regulating how much miners got for their coal: 
Q. How do you regulate the price—just by personal inspection? 
A. Yes.
Q. The men have no say in the matter? 
A. Yes; they have a great deal to say in the matter and they do not
be long telling about it either.34
On the long-standing question of  what was called the “Stoney Balance”—where
many places were so riddled with stone that miners believed they could not make a
decent living at the prevailing rates—the secretary (once again expressing impatience
with the loquacity of  lodge members) noted a “Lenthey [lengthy] discussion over
the matter which it would pussle [puzzle] a lawyer to write down the Pros and
con’s.”35
The most fundamental freedom of  all was freedom of  the workers to as-
sociate in an effective and enduring organization. The traditional approach to the
PWA, which understandably emphasizes its preoccupation with moral and legislative
reform, has not paid due attention to the tenacity with which lodges defended the
miners’ wages. The reason for this is probably that the hard bargaining over the
price of  the miners’ coal often took place on a very local, place-by-place and bal-
ance-by-balance level. Pioneer Lodge went on strike four times from 1882 to 1886,
and threatened to strike on twenty-three other occasions: an actual or impending
strike was a factor in just under a fifth of  the cases handled by the Lodge. These
strikes were sometimes thought of  as an egalitarian exercise in cutting preening of-
ficials down to size. As the minutes of  February 19, 1884 record, the Committee
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“went out and after some time returned reporting they could not get a chance to
speak to the manager who was engaged in a prayer meeting the Com[mittee] advised
the men to stay home tomorrow and let the manager look for the com. awhile…”36
The manager came to terms after a two-day strike. 
In these and other respects, then, the liberal order in the mine entailed, to
a point, the freedom of  speech and freedom of  association. Yet it is important not
to idealize it. It is likely the union made the mine somewhat safer in the 1880s, by
keeping both coal miners and the company on their toes—there were only fourteen
fatalities in Springhill from 1879 to 1890, a very low level when compared to mines
in nearby Pictou County. However, the explosion of  1891—by some measures one
of  the worst in North America to date, and one resulting from problems lodge ac-
tivists had diagnosed but could not resolve—was a stark reminder of  the high price
that might be demanded of  anyone entering this liberal terrain. 
Indeed, liberal individualism made it difficult for both union and manage-
ment to grasp the mine as a structured and structuring reality, transcending in its
effects any individual, and ultimately moved by the supra-individual and transna-
tional forces of  a capitalist economy. Although one finds ardent working-class de-
bates about the physical causes of  explosions, one searches the labour records in
vain for a general appraisal of  safety conditions. Rather, one often finds cutting cri-
tiques of  particular managers, specific innovations, and isolated incidents. Liberalism
in the mine had epistemological consequences: it made it difficult to go beyond the
individual case to the underlying structure—logical, physical, political—without
which that case could not exist. 
But what of  liberalism beyond the mine? Surely, the admirer of  Emile
Zola might hope, the coal miners lived up to our grim expectations—eking out im-
poverished lives dependent upon price-gouging company stores and company hous-
ing, and existing as mere alienated beasts of  burden living lives of  quiet desperation?
Well, not so much. By most standards, Springhill coal miners were well-paid workers.
Neither company stores nor company housing really caught on in Springhill. The
company store faded out in the 1880s and the town boasted many merchants. Out
of  818 houses in the town in 1891, only 70 were company-owned dwellings, pro-
viding accommodation for about 120 families. This housing pattern resulted directly
from the class struggle. In the union’s founding strike in 1879, the management had
resorted to the tried-and-true method of  evicting union men and their families from
their company housing. It backfired: the miners found alternative accommodation
among local farmers, merchants, and in the woods. After that, the company started
to sell off  its land and houses to generate cash. From the 1880s, miners were eager
purchasers of  such properties, and an unprecedented housing boom followed. PWA
leader Robert Drummond, who invested in this development, hailed the drive for
working-class housing as a confirmation of  the PWA’s social philosophy: “The prop-
erty ‘boom’ still continues,” he wrote in 1881. He went on, “There has been more
purchases of  lots during the past week. It is a pleasing feature of  the present time,
74 McKay
that the working men are striving to possess little households of  their own. The ex-
hortations to thrift repeated weekly in the Union lodge meetings, are producing a
satisfactory effect.” It was, he noted, an indication of  the virtues of  the union’s doc-
trine of  “wise economy.”37
Yet home ownership, for all the bourgeois virtues Drummond empha-
sized, had three contradictory consequences. As would become glaringly obvious
in the twentieth century, it gave the men independence from the company in times
of  industrial conflict. The threat of  eviction no longer applied. If  striking miners
could often find jobs in other coalfields, even in the West, they (and more particu-
larly their wives, who kept their families together in their absence) could hold out
for a long time. Secondly, and ironically, for all the individual autonomy and re-
spectability Drummond hoped would result from such home ownership, it tied the
miners and their families ever closer to the mine. To finance home ownership, work-
ers had to keep working, and often so did their sons—even the very young ones.
And third, increased home ownership also meant the Town of  Springhill’s fiscal
health depended on taxing workingmen’s cottages, with the result that Springhillers
faced a higher rate of  municipal taxation than was normal in Nova Scotia. But the
flip side of  those high taxes was a high degree of  miners’ involvement in the affairs
of  the town. 
Miners who had learned a labourist version of  liberalism in their workplace
carried their workplace organizing traditions “outward to social and political rela-
tionships in the wider community,” as Craig Heron pointed out in 1984.38 Indeed,
working-class liberalism—or lib-labism—affected all of  Springhill, not just the coal
mine. There was a middle class in that wider community—people who made their
living in ways different than working for wages or directly exploiting those who
did—and they were numerous in the town government. Yet such middle-class peo-
ple were reminded countless times of  their acute dependence upon the miners,
without whom the town would not exist. If  a merchant wanted to collect monies
owed him by an impecunious miner, even in cases that might seem an indictment
of  fecklessness and self-indulgence, he must brace himself  against a barrage of
public criticism, followed by the threat of  a withdrawal of  custom. Most merchants,
it seems, played along. In 1887, Pioneer Lodge thanked the merchants of  Springhill
for their generous contributions to the strike relief  fund set up for miners at the
time of  the Pictou coalfields general strike.39 That these merchants had contributed
to the relief  of  striking coal miners in a distant coalfield suggested how much they
wanted to stay in the miners’ good books. 
The town government often placed town interests ahead of  those of  the
company, on such questions as water provision and civic order. The town’s mayor
usually inclined to the labour side, not the company side. As ratepayers and citizens,
miners expected to be listened to. They could then become (as Heron reminds us)
allies of  middle-class reformers, and they held the upper hand in any such coalition.
Even doctors, paid for by the miners, were hardly in a position of  “middle-class in-
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dependence” in Springhill. Some found themselves criticized in public for unethical
practices, such as attempting to prevent patients transferring from one doctor to
another. 
Such local labourism had dramatic political consequences. Working-class
liberalism was hardly a matter of  windy rhetoric about the dignity of  labour, nor
of  gullible workers succumbing to the wiles of  self-interested politicians. In
Springhill, working-class liberalism won practical results. Premier W.S. Fielding, later
to be Laurier’s Minister of  Finance and a warm friend of  the Canadian business
class, came to Springhill to mediate the big strike in 1890. This was the first of  al-
most two dozen strikes in this coalfield, with the last persisting almost twenty-two
months, from 1909 to 1911. Fielding’s intervention secured the workers a more
comprehensive written contract and a promising system of  mediation. Motivated
in part by his long-term ambition to liberate the coal miners from the grip of  the
protectionist Tories, so that they might be incorporated into his own rival Liberal
universe, Fielding was also driven by the consideration that the provincial govern-
ment directly depended upon coal royalties. The miners achieved real victories, as
new legislation requiring a two-year process of  training and certification of  mines
was introduced in 1891. This was officially promoted as a safety measure; it also re-
sponded to the coal miners’ perennial complaint about overcrowding and, in the
absence of  an apprenticeship system, imposed some state-sanctioned limitations
on importing unseasoned newcomers. The workers’ defence of  their property
rights—the most fundamental of  which was their right of  secure access to the
means of  labour—could be brought into powerful alignment with the state’s interest
in safeguarding its own property rights. These included the right to collect royalties
on the mining industry, which presupposed mines that were relatively stable, safe,
and predictable. 
Liberalism was evident in other ways as well. The great moral reform
movement gripping nineteenth-century Springhill, as well as much of  Canada, was
temperance. From the days of  William Gladstone—whose name adorned another
PWA lodge—this had been favoured by many liberals, keen to protect the autonomy
and dignity of  the individual from the perils of  drink. Drummond, an activist in
the Springhill Temperance Reform Club, demolished the casks of  a liquor-seller
and sent their contents into the gutter in his capacity as a J.P. Under Drummond,
the PWA secured provincial legislation forbidding the sale of  liquor within one mile
of  a coal mine, and the union all but overtly urged vigilantism against drink-sellers.
It also sometimes winked at direct action against overbearing bosses. Some wives
of  coal miners were thought to be strong supporters of  the union’s policy—one
letter from a miner’s wife argued:
I am afraid that most of  your members look upon the union as
just an institution to secure better wages for them … But Mr. Ed-
itor, could I not point you out a large number of  wives in S. Hill
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who would rather have their husbands earning one dollar per day,
and sober all the time, than two dollars and them drunk half  the
time.40
In many miners’ minds, including those of  the most left-wing activists, temperance
was a necessary element of  creating a disciplined workforce.  Although temperance
was a cross-class issue, which drew support from many churches, middle-class pro-
fessionals, and employers, it would be a mistake to underestimate its deep roots in
the workplace itself. Great emphasis was placed on securing the discharge of
drunken workmen, on the practical argument that they might blow up many of
their fellow workers, and some went so far as to call for the discharge of  men for
being drunk on Sunday. The coal company discharged employees for drunkenness
without possibility of  appeal, as fourteen men discovered in December 1890. The
PWA was not on their side. 
Of  course, not all miners were persuaded, and the weekends after payday
were notoriously noisy. “Rogue’s Corner” was “the most vicious place in S. Hill. A
person can go on any Sunday and get a shave, or his hair dressed, or his picture
taken, or get drunk.”41 Pay-day crowds gathered at the Corner for drinking,
carousals, and fights. That such disreputable pleasures could impinge upon Pioneer
Lodge’s functioning was revealed in its acting secretary’s weary comment in 1884
(all the errors are his own): 
Poineer Lodge upened in Regular form M[aster] W[orkman] in
Chair Readings of  Minutes was dispensed with as the Secy and
most of  the members were absent, having to atend the perform-
ance of  a Card Sharper and patent meds hack at rogues Corner.42
Rogue’s Corner also acquired a reputation for prostitution, as we learn from its des-
ignation “red curtain corner” in January 1885—a problem “solved,” with the Trades
Journal’s implicit approval, by vigilante violence:
Between four and five o’clock on Sunday morning a crowd raided
a disreputable house at ‘Rogue’s corner,’ cleared out the proprietor,
smashed the windows, removed the inmates, and horsewhipped a
temporary lodger out the house and up the street to his boarding
house. The inmates were given, on Monday, a few hours to clear
out of  Springhill.43
In short, this “labour town” could, in its zealous pursuit of  respectability
and order, sometimes be mistaken for a middle-class community. But it could never
be called a “company town,” as that term has been conventionally used in Canada.
No description of  Springhill was complete without a passage extolling its handsome
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public buildings, including its magnificent churches, tidy homes, opera house, and
schools. Working-class liberalism, taken as a Lockean program of  workers asserting
at least a qualified ownership over that with which their labour had been mixed,
with all a radical might read into that situation from an egalitarian perspective, had
seemingly worked. Here was a sort of  “poster-community” for working-class lib-
eralism.
It also became the “poster-community” of  unbridled class conflict. From
June 1890 to December 1911, there were 28 strikes in the town of  Springhill—the
last of  which endured for nearly two years. There was no comparison between these
strikes and the short stoppages under the classical liberal regime. The strikes of
1890, 1897, 1899, 1903, 1905, and 1907, culminating in the great twenty-two-month
strike of  1909–11, bore to the strikes of  1880–1888 the same relationship of  a war
to a minor skirmish. No other community in the Maritime provinces, and surely
few in Canada, matched this record. Classical liberalism—this order we have defined
with reference to shared understandings governing property, freedom and equal-
ity—had plainly entered a crisis in Springhill at the turn of  the century.
This crisis resulted from a bold and integrated attempt to revolutionize
the social relations of  mining; to replace the informal common law of  the pit with
written regulations; to transcend the on-the-spot decision-making of  miners and
managers with a comprehensive plan; to destroy the individualism of  the miner by
making him over into a subservient employee; and thus, one might say, to replace
classical liberalism with corporate liberalism. This program was aggressively pushed
by an entrepreneur who had acquired his ABCs of  labour relations in a very differ-
ent context—Montreal—and who conducted himself  like a palace-inhabiting po-
tentate; or, to remember Heron’s article, like an “evil [force] of  economic
privilege.”44
From the 1890s to the 1920s, the local liberal order that the miners had
so successfully turned to their own interest entered a profound crisis, one con-
sciously created by a capitalist with a completely different agenda. It shook the min-
ers from their accustomed ways and attachments, disrupted their age-old
individualistic patterns of  negotiating settlements in the mine, and opened possi-
bilities for socialists and industrial unionists with different ways of  conceptualizing
the realities of  mining. In Springhill, we see the emergence of  a new ideological
pattern: a fundamental radicalization of  working-class liberalism that inherited its
emphasis on liberty and equality, but substantially critiqued its traditional attachment
to possessive individualism. 
More than thirty years on, Craig Heron’s pathbreaking work on labourism
stands up remarkably well. In this case, one might supplement it by emphasizing
the shifting realities and ideals of  property, which on my reading of  this evidence,
played a highly significant role in both the rise of  working-class liberalism, and its
severe turn-of-the-century crisis. An implication of  situating this ideological pattern
in a liberal order framework is the suggestion that, rather than mere epiphenomenal
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elements of  the “superstructure,” liberal conceptions of  freedom, equality, and
above all property were actively and contradictorily at work in the “base” itself. 
Talk of  a big strike started in June 1888, as workers awakened to the ag-
gressive imposition of  a system of  top-down control by a new management. The
quasi-Jacobin rhetoric was memorable:
The battle cry ‘To arms’ must be sounded. We must throw off  the
iron yoke of  tyranny. It has been demonstrated of  late that justice
is not a guiding principle with the officials … Disunited the work-
ers are as chaff. United they are a power capable of  bringing tyran-
nous bosses to their senses.45
It was as if  the miners were confronting some monstrous and hideous challenge to
everything they believed in. One miner walking through Springhill heard a newspa-
per vendor crying out the exploits of  Jack the Ripper in London. He read the head-
lines: “All London in a state of  terror. Two other victims added to the Whitechapel
mystery.” But then he thought of  a Springhill miner, dismissed after sixteen years
of  service to the company. “Now Sir,” he proclaimed,
how is so much horror expressed at a crime, that happened four
thousand miles away, when we see, if  not as bad, nearly so, pass-
ing in our very midst … I claim that when a man is deprived of
the means of  earning a livelihood, merely to satisfy the tyrannical
mania which has infused itself  into the nature of  certain officials
in this locality, that only in name does it fail to be as heinous as
the Whitechapel mystery.46
By the time of  the great strike of  1909–1911, observers would be surprised by the
proliferation of  red flags in Springhill on May Day—some of  them affixed to the
front porches of  the tidy houses the miners themselves owned. What one might
call a heartland of  nineteenth-century labourism—this distinctive variant of  Cana-
dian liberalism—had by some estimates become the reddest town in the entire Do-
minion. To defend the liberal freedoms they had nurtured and cherished, many
miners grasped that such freedoms could only survive in a post-capitalist order.
Perhaps their hard-earned lesson is one we need to re-learn in the twenty-first cen-
tury.  
Liberalism in (and beyond) the Coal Mine 79
NOTES
1 Craig Heron, “Labourism and the Canadian Working Class,” Labour/Le Travail
13 (Spring, 1984): 45–76.
2 Ibid., 45.
3 Ibid., 46–47.










14 Royden Harrison, ed., Independent Collier: The Coal Miner as Archetypal Proletarian
Reconsidered (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1978); C.B. Macpherson, “The Meaning
of  Property,” in Property: Mainstream and Critical Positions, ed. C.B. Macpherson
(Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 1978), 202, 10.
15 Trades Journal (Stellarton),  July 11, 1883.
16 Labour Canada Library, Gatineau, Provincial Workmen’s Association, Grand
Council Minutes [hereafter Grand Council Minutes], April 1889, 196; For much
fuller documentation of  the primary sources mentioned in this article, see Ian
McKay, “Industry, Work, and Community in the Cumberland Coalfields, 1848–
1927,” PhD Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1983.
17 Grand Council Minutes, April 1889, 195. 
18 Grand Council Minutes, April 1888, 174. 
19 Trades Journal,  March 9, 1887.
20 Dalhousie University Archives, Halifax, McKay Oral History Fonds, Transcripts,
Springhill Interviews, 92–93. The tapes themselves are located in the Dalhousie
University Archives. 
21 Cases are defined as all attempts by any persons to solve particular problems
through appeal to the lodge. They do not include general wage demands, collective
political action, or the routine administration of  relief. Cases might be ‘disputed’
by management, or represent no dispute with management—as in disputes with
other members of  the lodge, or suggestions for changes adopted without argument
by the company. These data are generated from the Lodge’s minutes: see Angus L.
80 McKay
Macdonald Library, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Minutes of  Pioneer
Lodge No. 1 of  the Provincial Workmen’s Association, 1882–1886 [hereafter
Springhill Minutes],
22 See Jeffrey McNairn, The Capacity To Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democ-
racy in Upper Canada, 1791–1854 (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 2000). He
draws upon the work of  Jürgen Habermas.
23 Morning Chronicle (Halifax), December 2, 1890,  December 4, 1890.
24 Springhill Minutes, May 1, 1884.
25 Trades Journal, August 6, 1884. 
26 Springhill Minutes,  June 16, 1884.
27 For the official regime, see Nova Scotia, “Of  the regulation of  coal mines,” Re-
vised Statutes of  Nova Scotia, 4th series, 1873; “An Act to amend Chapter 8, Revised
Statutes, ‘Of  the Regulation of  Coal Mines’,” 54 Vic., cap. 9, Statutes of  Nova Scotia,
1891.
28 A telephone made its appearance in Springhill in 1879, and was judged “very
serviceable.” But beyond the main slope there were only the most primitive
means of  communication. Men would bring word of  problems to the deputy in
the pit, and messages would pass through the lamp-cabin or be exchanged by
men during the breaks. Nova Scotia, House of  Assembly, “Report on Mines,”
Journals and Proceedings of  the House of  Assembly of  the Province of  Nova Scotia (Halifax:
Queen’s Printer, 1879), 3.
29 For a description, see Ian McKay, “The Realm of  Uncertainty: The Experience
of  Work in the Cumberland Coal Mines, 1873–1927,” Acadiensis 16, no. 1 (Au-
tumn 1986): 3–57.
30 Springhill Minutes, January 12, 1884.
31 Public Archives of  Nova Scotia, Halifax, RG21, Mines and Mining in Nova Scotia,
Henry Swift Letterbooks [hereafter Swift Letterbooks], Swift to J.R. Cowans, January
20, 1890.
32 Swift Letterbooks, Swift to Cowans, March 29, 1890.
33 Trades Journal, September 25, 1889. 
34 Royal Commission on the Relations of  Labour and Capital, Evidence-Nova Scotia, Evidence
of  William Hall, (Ottawa, 1889), 298.
35 Springhill Minutes, February 4, 1885. 
36 Springhill Minutes, February 19, 1884. 
37 Robert Drummond, Editorial Comments, Trades Journal,  May 11, 1891, August
3, 1891. 
38 Heron, “Labourism,” 51. 
39 Trades Journal, February 23, 1887. 
Liberalism in (and beyond) the Coal Mine 81
40 Trades Journal,  October 31, 1883. 
41 Trades Journal, November 8, 1882. 
42 Springhill Minutes, August 14, 1884. 
43 Trades Journal, August 12, 1885. 
44 Heron, “Labourism,” 58. 
45 Trades Journal, June 6, 1888. 
46 Trades Journal, October 24, 1888. 
